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As agents get smarter and our expec-
tations of their capabilities rise corre-
spondingly, we will no doubt treat
them more anthropomorphically. It is
already common for both system
designers and users to attribute
beliefs and intentions to agents—
much the way people attribute such
cognitions to their pets. For example,
we might say that our cat appears
aloof because it believes it is superior
to its owners. 
We also use such terms for
machines, especially when we are
annoyed with them. For example, if
an ATM gives us the wrong foreign
exchange, we might wonder if it
intends to cheat us—a possibility that
would be replaced by more benign
attributions if the ATM actually gave
more money than we expected.
In the case of agents, however, the
basis for ascribing beliefs and inten-
tions to their actions is not just senti-
mental or frivolous. Even though
computational agents are pieces of
machinery, their designs must be
specified and behaviors commanded
by humans. And because humans
think and speak using cognitive terms
such as beliefs, knowledge, desires,
and intentions, it is more natural to
use the same cognitive concepts when
constructing agents and assigning
tasks to them.
Cognitive Reflections of
Environmental States
An agent operates in some physical or
computational environment. An
agent is itself a physical system of
some sort. Even a pure software agent
is embodied on a computer that gives
a home to the agent’s internal struc-
tures (data structures, if you will) and
enacts its program.
For an agent to act properly in a
changing environment, some combi-
nation of its data structures and pro-
gram must reflect the information it
has about its environment. Because
this information would reflect the
state of the environment according to
the agent, it can be termed its knowl-
edge or a set of its beliefs. (The distinc-
tion between knowledge and beliefs is
stronger in ordinary language than it
is in the literature about agents, where
knowledge is usually treated simply as
true belief. Some researchers represent
the relationship between the two
using additional attributes, such as
justifications, but we’ll just accept the
simpler definition.) Desires corre-
spond to the state of the environment
the agent prefers. Intentions corre-
spond to the state of the environment
the agent is trying to achieve, which
should be a consistent subset of the
agent’s desires and directly connected
to the agent’s actions. 
Notice that it is the human design-
er who determines the agent’s beliefs,
desires, and intentions in an environ-
ment. However, to make sense, these
beliefs, desires, and intentions must
be related to the agent’s perceptions
and actions. This relationship can be
captured in an agent architecture such
as the one shown in Figure 1.
Applying Cognitive Concepts
The relationship is mediated by the
agent’s reasoning subsystem. For sim-
plicity and as is customary, let’s
assume that the agent’s desires are
given. The cognitive concepts can
then be used in two ways:1
n Means-ends reasoning. The agent
must decide what intentions to
adopt or revise, and what actions
to perform.
n Plan recognition. The agent must
infer the beliefs, desires, and inten-
tions of other agents in order to
cooperate or compete with them.
For example, suppose agent Al from
Figure 1 desires both ice cream and
soup, but given that the weather is
cold (and based on beliefs not men-
tioned here), Al intends to have only
soup. Means-end reasoning causes Al
to get soup from the pantry and heat
it in the microwave oven. In a second
example, Al sees Bo perform actions
or hears Bo’s statements indicating
that Bo is opening the refrigerator
door. From this action, Al uses plan
recognition to infer that Bo is about
to get ice cream. Knowing Bo to be
“rational,” Al figures that Bo does not
believe it is cold outside. Since Al is a
helpful agent, he tells Bo that it is
cold outside. 
Although the examples describe
only two agents in a kitchen, the
agents are reasoning about each
other’s actions, which could be
actions to access information if the
agents were in a Web environment.
A cognitive basis for an agent is
especially applicable when the agent is
to serve as a personal assistant in a
user interface. Based on its own inten-
tions and beliefs, the agent can infer
what its user needs by understanding
his or her intentions.2 This facilitates
“tasking,” allowing users to tell agents
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what to do rather than how to do it.
Such an agent might be able to solve
its user’s problem even if it happens to
be formulated incorrectly, which can
easily be the case when the user is ask-
ing for assistance.
Although intuitive, cognitive con-
cepts often have a number of conno-
tations in the vernacular. If we are
going to build computing systems
from cognitive concepts, we must be
sure of our interpretations and how
precisely they relate to an agent’s con-
struction. 
One class of properties that cogni-
tive theories seek to capture is the
relationships among the concepts. For
example,
n Beliefs are mutually consistent.
(This can be a demanding property
to realize in a practical system and
usually requires an agent’s beliefs to
be restricted in some way.)
n An agent will intend an action
only while it believes the action is
possible.
n An agent need not intend some-
thing that would happen anyway.
These kinds of properties have long
been under development. Much
progress has been made, but not every
important aspect has been worked
out. However, developers are proceed-
ing with practical systems based on
these concepts, providing valuable
input in refining the theories. 
(Note: Readers interested in details
on cognitive concepts can enter the
vast literature on the subject through
selections from our book, Readings in
Agents.3)  
Putting Cognitive Concepts
to Work
Three broad approaches have been
defined for implementing cognitive
concepts.4 The approaches are reflect-
ed in different agent architectures. 
In the first approach, designers use
cognitive concepts to model an agent’s
reasoning. The agent represents its
beliefs, intentions, and desires in
modular data structures and performs
explicit manipulations on those struc-
tures to carry out means-ends reason-
ing or plan recognition. When the
cognitive concepts are defined formal-
ly, the explicit manipulations can be
accomplished through the application
of a suitable theorem prover. Among
the best of the systems using this
approach is Artimis,5 an intentional
system designed for human interac-
tion and applied in a spoken-dialog
interface for information access. This
system is based on a logic of beliefs
and intentions, which it uses to carry
out effective dialogues with users.
Although its application domain is
somewhat narrow, Artimis’ use of a
theorem prover for cognitive concepts
makes it one of the purest systems of
its kind.
In the second approach, designers
can still use explicit representations of
cognitive concepts, but the concepts
are processed procedurally, rather
than via theorem proving. The proce-
dural approaches have better perfor-
mance than theorem proving, but
performance comes at the expense of
implementation simplicity and the
superior semantic basis of theorem
provers. Most practical agent architec-
tures based on cognitive concepts fall
into the procedural category. A
notable example is the belief, desire,
and intention (BDI) architecture4
instantiated in the procedural reason-
ing system (PRS) and the distributed
multiagent reasoning system (dMARS).
The third approach uses cognitive
concepts only for design and analysis.
A designer can think of an agent’s
behavior in cognitive terms, but the
agent itself would not have any
explicit representations of the cogni-
tive concepts. The agent might be just
a simple finite-state machine operat-
ing in a restricted environment. There
is continuing interest in such a “situ-
ated automata” approach, and it is
especially promising in settings where
higher performance is desired, but the
agent’s construction does not have to
be highly complex.
In each of these approaches, the
designer ascribes cognitive concepts to
the agent. The designer considers not
only the agent’s data structures, but
also how these structures are linked to
its sensors and effectors (see Figure 1),
and how the sensors and effectors in
turn are linked to the real environ-
ment. This is difficult, however, and
the agent’s resultant behavior might
not fully reflect the designer’s inten-
tions. An agent might still have false
beliefs, inappropriate desires, or
impossible intentions. Such eventuali-
ties can occur, for example, if the
agent is operating outside its normal
design range. In such a situation, the
intentional stance (see the sidebar on
this page) can help designers and
users understand and analyze why the
agent is behaving in an apparently
inappropriate manner.
Communicating Cognitively
Several researchers have proposed
using cognitive concepts as a seman-
tic basis for agent communications.6
One of the leading candidates for
such a semantics is based on Arcol,
the communication language used
within Artimis.5 Interestingly, this
application (not only of Arcol, but
also in general) appears extremely
misguided. The intentional concepts
are well-suited to designing agents,
but are not suited to giving a basis to
a public, standardizable view of com-
munication.6
C O L U M N
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Figure 1. An architecture for an agent that captures the beliefs, desires, and inten-
tions ascribed to the agent, and relates them to the agent’s perceptions and actions
in an environment.
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A challenge for using the cognitive
concepts is that although they are nat-
ural in several respects and can guide
implementations, full-blown imple-
mentations that try to be faithful to
every aspect of the model can end up
being computationally demanding.
As the cognitive concepts are put to
use in real applications, the principles
for simplifying the implementations
will emerge.  In any case, because of
their naturalness to humans, the cog-
nitive concepts are here to stay, and
we will do well to consider them in
the design of our agents. n
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The intentional stance is the philosophical view underlying the use of cognitive
concepts for agents. It was first promulgated by the computer scientist John
McCarthy1 and developed further by the philosopher Daniel Dennett.2 The inten-
tional stance simply states that cognitive concepts can be ascribed to any physical
system and that it is beneficial to do so for complex systems. Indeed, if a system is
sufficiently complex—such that complete physical details can never be known—the
intentional stance might be the only one that enables us to understand how it acts. 
People often use cognitive concepts to understand how others behave. For
example, we try to anticipate the actions of other drivers on the road by inferences
about their beliefs and intentions. We could never function as car drivers if we had
to reason about the neural states of the other drivers just to figure out if they were
about to change lanes. In fact, even though neuroscience hasn’t yet developed to
the stage where human brains can be mathematically modeled, people and even
animals have always been able to figure out each other’s beliefs and intentions to
more or less correctly predict each other’s actions. The idea, then, is to use cogni-
tive concepts to talk about the states of computational agents without needing to
know how those agents are implemented.
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A number of systems now exist that owe a large part of their functionality to cog-
nitive concepts. Two systems with practical applications are dMARS and Artimis as
alluded to above. dMARS is not publicly available, but two related systems are,
namely, University of Michigan PRS (UMPRS) and Jam!. 
Langage d’Agents Logiciel Objet (LALO) is a programming language based on
agent-oriented programming, in broad terms a variant of the cognitive concepts
discussed here.1 The STEAM system uses a model based on beliefs and intentions
to carry out effective teamwork among agents.2
Check them out!
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